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Abstract. The coordinated assurance of interrelated critical properties,
such as system safety and cyber-security, is one of the toughest challenges
in critical systems engineering. In this chapter, we summarise approaches
to the coordinated assurance of safety and security. Then, we highlight
the state of the art and recent challenges in human-robot collaboration in
manufacturing both from a safety and security perspective. We conclude
with a list of procedural and technological issues to be tackled in the
coordinated assurance of collaborative industrial robots.
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1 Introduction
Collaborative robots (or cobots3) are expected to drive the robotics market in
coming years [56], providing affordable, flexible, and simple-to-integrate robotic
solutions to traditionally manual processes. This transformational technology
will create new opportunities in existing markets such as food, agriculture,
construction, textiles, and craft industries [20,44], enabling more efficiency in
production while reducing operator workloads and removing occupational haz-
ards [20,55].
Cobots will ultimately enable humans and robots to share physical spaces,
and combine the benefits of automated and manual processes [57]. However,
current applications are in the main limited to those requiring little physical col-
laboration, with humans and robots sharing spaces but working sequentially [21];
close, physical collaboration in the true sense (with robots responding in real-
time to users) requires more complex sensing and control, resulting in highly
3 Throughout this chapter we refer to cobots as robots, including their software and
operational infrastructure, specifically designed for human-robot collaboration, al-
though we accept that traditional robots may be used in collaborative ways when
augmented with sufficient control and sensory systems.
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complex safety cases. Whilst cobots may be designed to be inherently safe (when
operating with limited capabilities), the process (and end effector or payload)
often poses a greater threat than the robot itself [55].
ISO 10218 [22] set the standard for safety of industrial robots. In 2016, with a
rapidly growing range of collaborative robots on the market, ISO 10218 was sup-
plemented by ISO/TS 15066 [23], which specifies additional safety requirements
for industrial collaborative robots. However, many manufacturing organisations
have indicated that these do not go far enough in providing guidance, and that
the lack of examples of good practice is hindering deployment of the technology.
As a result companies are falling back on traditional segregational approaches to
risk assurance, including physical or chronological isolation and barriers, which
counteract many of the lauded benefits of collaborative robots.
The aim of this chapter is to explore existing approaches and best-practice
for safety and security of collaborative robots, and to highlight the challenges.
Section 1.1 provides an overview of safety and security approaches applica-
ble to cobots. Sections 2 and 3 then elaborate on particular methodologies in
the context of an industrial case study. Following the two perspectives—social
and technical—of the Socio-Technical System (STS) design approach [5], Sec-
tion 4 enumerates additional socio-technical and technical challenges arising from
safety-security interactions.
1.1 General Approaches to Safety and Security
One of the main sources of difficulty, which prompts the need for guidance,
is the engineering complexity and diversity required to build a cobot, or indeed
any complex system that involves interactions with humans. In order to reconcile
multiple (often heterogeneous) goals and objectives, knowledge from multiple en-
gineering disciplines is needed – mechanical, electrical, process, human-computer
interaction, and safety and security. In this section, approaches to co-engineering
and co-assuring safety and security that can be applied to cobots are explored.
The discussion in this section will be an extension of previous work done in [24]
with an emphasis on literature and application to industrial control, robotics and
cobots. Throughout this section, assurance will refer to the process and outcome
of identifying, reducing and arguing about the level of risk.
Pietre-Cambacedes et al. [45] give a comprehensive view of methods, models,
tools and techniques that have initially been created in either safety or security
engineering and that have then been transposed to the other quality attribute.
However, one of the biggest challenges identified is the (mis-)use of risk language.
Whilst both deal with the notion of risk, and aim to prevent situations which
might result in negative consequences [11], their conditions and concepts of loss
are sufficiently different to cause conflict to arise. A classical example of this
is the conceptualisation of risk. Traditionally, the goal of safety is to prevent
death or injury, therefore safety risk is concerned only with the hazards that
might lead to an accident, and is calculated as a product of the likelihood of a
hazard occurring and the severity of that hazard (i.e. safety risk = likelihood
× severity). In contrast, the goal of security is to prevent loss of assets. These
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might include people, in which case the goal aligns with safety, however security
encompasses a much larger scope so assets might include process, intellectual
property, organisation reputation, and information. Thus many more factors
must be included when analysing security risk (i.e. security risk = (threat ×
access) × (business impact, confidentiality, etc.)).
Figure 1, taken from previous work done on co-assurance, shows a model
from the Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) [24]. In particular, it
highlights the safety and security processes and interactions during the system
lifetime. Each of the phases of the system will place different requirements on
safety and security practitioners, for example early stages will have a focus on
assisting the engineering process to lower the risk of the system, whereas during
operation, the practitioner’s focus will be on ensuring that operations are being
performed as expected and no assurance claims made earlier are being violated.
The core idea underlying SSAF is that of independent co-assurance that al-
lows for separate working but requires synchronisation points where information
is exchanged and trade-off decisions occur. This allows practitioners to use spe-
cialised expertise and progress to occur within each domain because there is a
shared understanding of what information will be required, and where and when
it should be provided.
There are different modes of interaction ranging from silos (characterised by
very few synchronisation points and little inter-domain communication) to uni-
fied approaches (where the attributes are co-engineered and co-assured together,
e.g. in [47]). A prerequisite for knowing information needs at synchronisation
points is understanding the causal relationships within and between domains.
This can be achieved using multiple approaches, some of which are shown in
Table 1 which contains a subset of approaches that are commonly used. Ap-
proaches to safety and security risk management can be classified into several
groups according to their level of formalism and their objectives. The classifica-
tion framework of (1) structured risk analysis, (2) architectural methods, and
(3) assurance and standards has been adapted from [45]:
(1) Structured Risk Analysis. These approaches are concerned primarily
with understanding the cause-effect relationships for particular risks. In safety,
hazards are analysed by experts using structured reasoning approaches such as
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Modes Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA), and Bow Tie Analysis. These function by requiring the
analyst to consider risk sources and outcomes systematically by using guide
words over system functions. Example guidewords are too much, too little, too
late, etc.; when applied to a cobot speed function would allow the analyst to
reason about what would happen if the cobot was too fast/slow/late performing
a task in a specific context. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) requires
the system to be modelled as a controlled process rather than decomposing it
into functions. Hazards relating to the control structure are then reasoned about.
The advantage of this approach is that hazards introduced by failure of intent
are more readily identified than analysing functions, for example, where a cobot
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Fig. 1: SSAF Interaction Model with Synchronisation Points (taken from [24]).
Table 1: Approaches to Safety and Security Assurance Applicable to Cobots.
Approach Safety Security Joint
(1) Structured Risk Analysis
HAZOP [10] [53] [59]
FME(C)A [15] [6] [48]
Bowtie Analysis [61] [7] [1] [8]
STPA [35] [60] [14]
STRIDE [40]
FTA [17] [25] [47]
Attack Trees [49] [33] [47]
(2) Architectural Approaches, Testing & Monitoring
ATAM [29]
Metrics [31]
Failure Injection [43] [4]
(3) Assurance & Standards
Assurance Cases [30] [19]
Standards IEC 61508 IEC 62443 IEC TR 63069
ISO 10218 ISO 15408 (CC)
ISO/TS 15066 ISO 27001
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function does not fail and system requirements are satisfied, but it still leads to
an unsafe state. There have been multiple adaptations of safety approaches to
include security guidewords and prompts such as security-informed HAZOPs,
FMVEA (FMEA and Vulnerabilities Analysis) and STPA-Sec.
Similar to its safety counterparts, STRIDE is a security threat analysis model
that assists analysts to reason about types of threats relating to spoofing, tam-
pering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of
privilege (more information is provided in Section 3). The main limitation of
structured risk analysis is their over-reliance on expert opinion which makes the
outcome only as good as the analyst performing the analysis [24].
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [17] is one of the earliest approaches used in safety
analysis. Its process requires that the causes of functional failures and faults are
decomposed; the outcome is then modelled in a directed acyclic graph as events
connected by AND and OR gates. This tree-based approach has been extended
to apply to both attacks and threats in security [49,33]. Whilst the formality
of these types of models allows for an improved review and audit of the risk
analysis, they are limited by the assumptions made during the analysis process
and whether or not they are validated subsequent to the analysis.
(2) Architectural Approaches, Testing & Monitoring. The third class of
approaches seeks to understand the trade-offs between safety and security for
the system architecture, and the effects of risk during operation. Architectural
Trade-Off Analysis Method (ATAM) [29] is a methodology that allows structured
negotiation of architectural strategies for quality attributes including safety and
security. Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) [8] relies on applying Bow-
Tie analysis to architectural models to understand the impact of dependability
attributes on each other. In addition to these approaches, which are primarily
applied early in the system development lifecycle, there are approaches that seek
to test and verify the requirements output at even earlier stages. In addition to
architectural model approaches such as ATAM and DDA, the concept of joint
safety and security metrics [31] has been proposed to understanding safety and
security functional assurance in industrial control systems. Examples of failure
injection and testing include Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Prop-
agation Studies (HiP-HOPS) [43] which is a safety technique wherein Simulink
models are used to generate fault trees to assess the impact of different faults.
In security, penetration testing [4] is often used as an approach to understand
the vulnerabilities in the engineered system.
(3) Assurance & Standards. The final class of approaches seeks to manage
risk through safety and security processes and standards. The industrial control
safety standard IEC 61808 is arguably the most influential safety standard cre-
ated as many safety standards from other domains are its derivatives; examples
include ISO 10218 [22] (robotics) and ISO/TS 15066 [23] (cobots). Similarly
for security IEC 62443 (ICS product security), ISO 27001 (organisation security
process), ISO 15408 (security requirements) have been applied to a wide range
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of industries. Standards from both domains have been largely isolated with very
little alignment, however, as security has the potential to undermine the safety
of a system, the two should be considered in conjunction. In an attempt to ad-
dress this problem, joint standards are being created. One such standard is IEC
TR 63069 (applied to ICS), which advocates the creation of a security perimeter
within which safety analysis is performed. A fundamental part of the certifica-
tion process for standards is presenting a structured argument with evidence to
show that the assurance criteria have been satisfied. This argument takes the
form of safety cases and security cases (examples of each in [30] and [19]).
Many of the approaches described above are general approaches or have been
applied within an industry related to cobots, such as industrial control. There
has been some preliminary application of many of these methods to cobots, for
example, Lichte and Wolf [38] use an approach that combines graphical formal-
ism and architectural methods to understand the safety and security of a cobot;
this is a good start, however it still leaves many challenges unaddressed. In the
following sections, we provide an illustrative cobot example and further details
about the safety and security challenges.
1.2 Illustrative Example: The Cobot
In the previous section, the focus was on general approaches to safety and secu-
rity that could be applied to a collaborative robotic system. However, there is
a paucity of information about how these work in practice. The industrial case
study discussed in the following Sections 2 and 3, seek to provide greater clarity
about how to undertake safety and security analysis for a cobot.
As many types of human-robot interactions, Kaiser et al. describe scenarios
of co-existence [28]: (1) Encapsulation, with physically fenced robot work areas,
(2) co-existence, without fencing but separation of human and robot work areas,
(3) cooperation, with shared work areas but without simultaneous operation in
the shared area, and (4) collaboration, with shared work areas and simultaneous,
potentially very close interaction inside the shared area.
In our example, we consider scenarios that match (3) or (4) and a system
that comprises primarily of a plant (i.e. a manufacturing cell including one or
more robots), operators, and an automatic controller.
2 Cobot Safety
In this section, we (i) review safety risk analysis and handling in human-robot col-
laboration and (ii) highlight recent challenges in the development of controllers
implementing the safety requirements.
2.1 Analysing Safety Risks in Cobot Settings
In safety analysis, one focuses on two phenomena: accidents and hazards. An
accident is a more or less immediate and undesired consequence of a particular
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combination of the plant’s state and the environment’s state, which together
form the cause of the accident. The plant’s portion of such a cause is called a
hazard and the environment’s portion an environmental condition [36, p. 184],
both first-class entities of safety risk analysis.
Safety Risks. Accidents, their causes, and hazards in human-robot co-existence
in manufacturing have been discussed in the literature since the mid 1970s
(e.g. [54,27,2,28]). Notably, Nicolaisen [42] envisioned collaborative, potentially
mobile, robots closely working together with humans in shared work areas in
1985. In 1986, Jones [27] distinguished two major classes of hazards relevant to
human-robot collaboration:
– Impact hazards: Unexpected movements (e.g. effectors or joints reaching
beyond the planned work area), for example due to failing equipment (e.g.
valves, cables, electronics, programs); dangerous work pieces handled (e.g.
released) in an unexpected or erroneous manner; manipulations (e.g. welding,
cutting, transport) with hazardous side effects (e.g. welding sparks, flying
tools or work piece residuals, robots bumping into humans).
– Trapping hazards: Workers are trapped between a robot and a static ob-
ject (e.g. a machine or cage wall) while the robot is active or in a program-
ming, maintenance, or teaching mode.
Both classes of hazards can cause the robot to collide with, or catch, a human
co-worker. This includes robot joints, end-effectors, or dangerous work pieces
hitting and injuring co-workers.
2.2 Handling Safety Risks in Cobot Settings
Accidents or hazards can be prevented by employing measures to avoid their
occurrence. More generally, accidents or hazards can be mitigated by employ-
ing measures to significantly reduce accident or hazard probability or reduce
accident severity. An accident cause is considered latent4 if there are sufficient
resources (e.g. time, bespoke safety measures) to mitigate the accident (e.g. by
removing the hazard or the environmental condition).
For example, a robot arm on its way to a shared area W (hazard) and the
operator on their way toW (environmental condition) form a cause of an impact
accident to happen. This cause seems immediate unless a measure (e.g. stopping
the arm on a collision signal, or the operator jumping away) renders it to be
latent, i.e. possible if this measure were to stay inactive.
Measures can be either intrinsic (not requiring control equipment) or func-
tional5 (requiring control equipment). A functional measure is said to be passive
if it mitigates certain accidents (e.g. a car airbag system) and active if it prevents
4 As opposed to immediate causes falling outside the scope of risk handling.
5 Note that functional safety in IEC 61508 or ISO 26262 deals with the dependability,
particularly, correctness and reliability, of critical programmable electronic systems.
Safety functions or, here, “functional measures” form the archetype of such systems.
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Table 2: Examples of safety measures in human-robot collaboration, classified
by stage of escalation and by the nature of the underlying technical mechanism
Stage Type Intrinsic Functional
Hazard
prevention
1) Safety barrier,
physical safeguard
Fence Interlock
2) Avoidance of
development mistakes
Controller
verification
Controller verification
Hazard
mitigation
& accident
prevention
3) Improved reliability
and fault-tolerance
Fault-tolerant scene
interpretation
4) Intrusion detection
(static, dynamic,
distance-based)
Speed & separation
monitoring; safety-rated
monitored stop
5) Hand-guided
operation
Accident
mitigation
6) Power and force
limiting
Lightweight
components,
flexible surfaces
Variable impedance control,
touch-sensitive and
force-feedback control
7) System halt Emergency stop
certain accidents (e.g. an emergency braking system). Functional measures focus-
ing on the correctness, reliability, or fault-tolerance of the controller (nowadays a
complex programmable electronic system) are called dependability measures [2].
Safety Measures. Experience from accidents and risk analyses has lead to
many technological developments [2,18,28], partly inspired by precautions when
interacting with machinery. Table 2 gives an overview of measures in use.
Concepts for Functional Measures. Jones [27, p. 100] describes safety mon-
itors as an additional control device for safety actions like emergency stop and
limiters (e.g. speed, force). He further suggests safety measures be designed
specifically for each mode of operation (e.g. programming or teaching, normal
working, and maintenance), each to be examined for its designed and aberrant
behaviour [27, p. 87]. Internal malfunction diagnostics (e.g. programming er-
ror detection, electronic fault detection, material wear-out monitoring) can also
inform such a safety monitor and trigger mode-specific actions.
Alami et al. [2] highlight advantages of interaction-controlled robots over
position-controlled robots. The former are easier for planning and fewer assump-
tions on the structure of the work area and the robot’s actions need to be made,
while the latter need extensive pre-planning and require stronger assumptions.
Based on ISO 15066, Kaiser et al. [28] summarise design considerations (e.g.
work area layouts) and collaborative operation modes beyond traditionally re-
quired emergency stop buttons (also called dead man’s controls):
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– Safety-rated monitored stop: A stop is assured while powered, thus prohibit-
ing simultaneous operation of robot and operator in the shared area.
– Hand-guiding operation: The robot only exercises zero-gravity control and is
guided by the operator, hence, no actuation without operator input.
– Speed and separation monitoring : Robot speed is continuously adapted based
on several regions of distance between robot and operator.
– Power and force limiting : To reduce impact force on the human body, the
robot’s power and applied forces are limited.
Guidelines. Standardisation of safety requirements for industrial robots started
in Japan with the work of Sugimoto [54]. In the meantime, ANSI/RIA R15.06,
ISO 10218, 13482, and 15066 have emerged, defining safety requirements and
providing guidance for safety measures. The aforementioned safety modes are
part of the recommendations in ISO 15066.
2.3 Risk Analysis and Handling in a Cobot Example
In our example, an operator and a cobot undertake a spot-welding process.
The open-sided work cell consists of a robot positioned between a spot-welding
machine and a shared hand-over area. During normal operation an operator sits
outside the cell and uses this area for exchanging work pieces. The layout allows
staff to enter the active cell when needed.
In Table 3, we exemplify results of a preliminary safety analysis (i.e. haz-
ard identification, assessment, requirements derivation, cf. Section 2.1) of the
cell along with the identified safety requirements compliant with state-of-the-art
measures as summarised in Section 2.2. The right column specifies the overall
safety requirements for each accident and the technical safety requirements (e.g.
the mode-switch requirements) for each latent cause (left column) indicating
how the hazard can be removed from the critical state in due time. Each safety
requirement specifies the conditions of a corresponding measure to mitigate any
escalation towards one of the listed accidents.
2.4 Recent Challenges in Cobot Safety
Because robots and human co-workers have complementary skills, it has long
been an unfulfilled desire for both actors to simultaneously and closely work
in shared areas [27, p. 70]. Consequently, complex guarding arrangements, es-
tablished for safety reasons, interfere with efficient production workflows. For
mobile robots, fencing in the traditional sense is rarely an option. Back in the
1980s, another problem was that robots often had to be programmed through
a teaching-by-demonstration approach with workers in the cage while robots
fully powered. However, this rather unsafe method has been superseded by more
sophisticated programming techniques (e.g. simulation, digital twins).
From the viewpoint of co-workers, close interaction has proven to be diffi-
cult in some settings as invisible joint motion planning procedures not rarely
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Table 3: Results of hazard identification, assessment, and mitigation analysis
referring to measures recommended in ISO 15066
Critical Event Safety Requirement†
Accident (undesired, to be mitigated)
The robot arm collides with
the operator.
The robot shall avoid active collisions with the opera-
tor.
Welding sparks cause opera-
tor injuries (i.e. burns).
The welding machine avoids sparks injuring the opera-
tor.
Latent Cause (to be reacted upon in a timely manner)
The operator and the robot
use the shared hand-over area
at the same time.
(m) The robot shall perform a safety-rated monitored
stop and (r) resume normal operation after the operator
has left the shared hand-over area.
The operator approaches the
shared hand-over area while
the robot is away from the
hand-over area (undertaking
a different part of the pro-
cess).
(m) If the robot is transferring a work piece to the hand-
over area then it shall switch to power and force limiting
mode and (r) resume normal operation after the opera-
tor has left the shared hand-over area.
The operator has entered the
safeguarded area of the cell
while the robot is moving or
the welding process is active.
(m) The welding machine, if running, shall be switched
off and the robot shall switch to speed and separation
monitoring mode. (r) Both robot and welding machine
shall resume normal operation after the operator has
left the area and acknowledged the safety notification
provided via the operator interface.
The operator is close to the
welding spot while the robot
is working and the welding
process is active.
(m) The welding machine shall be switched off and the
robot shall perform a safety-rated monitored stop. (r)
Both robot and welding machine shall resume normal
operation or idle mode with a reset procedure after the
operator has left the area and acknowledged the safety
notification provided via the operator interface.
† (m) . . . mitigation, (r) . . . resumption
result in unpredictable joint/effector movement patterns. Assuming collabora-
tive scenarios with complex tasks shared between humans and robots, Hayes
and Scassellati [18] raise further conceptual issues, such as how cobots recognise
operator intent, how they autonomously take roles in a task, how they include
operators’ intent in their trade-offs, and how they self-evaluate quantities such
as risk during operation.
Unfortunately, more sophisticated robots incorporate a larger variety of more
complex failure modes. Sensors need to sufficiently inform the robot controller
for the estimation and timely reduction of the impact on the human body. For
example, “speed and separation monitoring” requires accurate and reliable sen-
sors (e.g. stereo-vision systems, laser scanners), particularly, when multiple safety
zones are considered, to be able to control several modes of operation. Unknown
faults, complex failure modes, and additional sensor inputs lead to security as a
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more than ever important prerequisite to assuring cobot safety, as pointed out by
Kaiser et al. [28]. Finally, the overarching challenge is to provide practical safety
and performance guarantees of the behaviour of a manufacturing cell based on
realistic assumptions and leading to certifiable assurance cases.
3 Security
As indicated in Section 2, an important aim of research has been to facilitate the
release of cobots from highly constrained caged environments to enable greater
productivity [41]. Ensuring their security is a critical aspect. The security of
robots has received less attention than safety concerns and cobot-specific secu-
rity issues have received hardly any attention at all. We can learn from extant
attempts to secure robots in general (though this area itself is still a challenge)
and seek to identify new challenges for cobots.
Some security issues have direct safety implications, for example any attack
that can gain control over the physical actions of a cobot may cause the robot
to behave in a physically dangerous fashion, even to the point of launching a
physical attack on the co-worker. Some, for example the leakage of personal data,
may not have any obvious safety effect, but must be addressed in a manner that
satisfies security related regulations (e.g. GDPR). Below we examine elements
of security whose challenges have particular relevance to cobot security.
3.1 Threat analysis
Threat Modelling is the use of abstractions which aid the process of finding
security risks. The result of this operation is often referred to as a threat model.
In the case of robotics, threat modelling defines risks that relate to the robot and
its software and hardware components while offering means to resolve or mitigate
them [58].6 In general terms, threat modelling is figuring out what might go
wrong in terms of security with the system being built, and helps address classes
of attacks, resulting in the delivery of a much more secure product [51].
An example of threat modelling used in various systems is STRIDE. Kohn-
fekder and Garg [32] introduced the STRIDE threat modelling approach in 1999
and it has since become one of the most commonly used threat modelling meth-
ods. The STRIDE acronym stands for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Denial
of Service and Elevation of Privilege. This methodology has recently been used
in a document concerning the threat modelling of robots [52] (at the time of
writing this is still a draft document).
Moreover, a novel way of identifying attacks/threat modelling is used in a
paper by Trend Micro [39]. They identify five robot specific attack classes and
their concrete effects, as depicted in Table 4.
6 We would add that analysing the wider system in which a cobot exists is essential,
since for example linking OT and IT—e.g. supporting accounting and other business
functions—is a common practice and greatly enlarges the threat landscape.
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Table 4: Types of attacks to robots by Trend Micro [39]
Requirements Violated
Robot Attack Class
Safety Integrity Accuracy
Concrete Effects
1. Altering the control loop
parameters
X X X Products are modified or
become defective
2. Tampering with calibra-
tion parameters
X X X Damage to robot
3. Tampering with the pro-
duction logic
X X X Products are modified or
become defective
4. Altering the user per-
ceived robot state
X X X Injuries to robot operator
5. Altering the robot state X X X Injuries to robot operator
3.2 Review of existing security approaches
Security Policies. For a system to be secure there needs to be an unequivo-
cal statement of what it means to be secure, what properties the system must
uphold, what must happen and what must not happen. Such a statement is typ-
ically provided by a security policy. The policy may cover physical (e.g. access
to a physical robot environment may be required to be via specific doors accessi-
ble only to authorised users), logical (e.g. access control policy), and procedural
aspects (e.g. vetting of staff). For example, Zong, Guo and Chen [62] propose
a policy-based access control system that enables permission management for
robot applications developed with ROS (Robot Operating System). They intro-
duce Android-like permissions so that each application in ROS can be controlled
as to whether a certain resource can be accessed or performed.
Authentication underpins security in various forms. It can be thought of as
the verification of one or more claims made about system agents or elements to
be valid, genuine or true. Most commonly, authentication applies to a user or a
process that wishes to gain access to a system and its resources. Authentication
may be required from the user to the system (user identification) or from the
system to the user.7 Dieber et al. [9] introduces a dedicated Authentication
Server (AS) that tracks which ROS node subscribes or publishes in a topic. The
aim of ROS is to provide a standard for the creation of robotic software that
can be used on any robot. A node is a sub-part of this robotic software. The
software contains a number of nodes that are placed in packages, two example
nodes are the camera driver and the image processing software. These nodes
need to communicate with each other [46]. The proposed AS also handles node
authentication and produces topic-specific encryption keys.
7 Though in many applications guarantees of authenticity of the system will be pro-
vided by physical and procedural means—for example, it may be practically very
hard to replace an authentic robot with a malicious or fake one.
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User authentication is typically provided in three ways: (i) something you
know, (ii) something you have, and (iii) something/someone you are. Passwords
are the most common means of user authentication. A claim is first made by
supplying a specific user identifier, or user id (the person supplying that user id
is claiming to be the person associated with it by the system). Accompanying
such a claim with a password recognised by the system is an example of (i).
(ii) is also a major means of authentication. Possession of a ‘token’ (or physical
identifier) is deemed to establish the link with an authorised user. Thus, Radio
Frequency Identification Tags (RFIDs) may be programmed with the identities
of specific users to whom they are given. Biometric approaches are examples
of (iii). These make use of physical (biological) or behavioural features of a user.
Fingerprints, voiceprints, retinal or iris images are all examples of biometrics
that can be used to identify a individual.
We would observe that most user authentication is one off : the user au-
thenticates at the beginning of a session and the privileges which go with such
authentication prevail throughout that session. Problems ensue when a user
walks away from a terminal and another user takes over, or when an authorised
user deliberately hands over to an unauthorised one. A variety of attempts have
been made to counter this using continuous authentication. Such approaches may
prove of significant use where cobots are concerned. Hass, Ulz and Steger [16]
approach this problem with expiring passwords and smart cards equipped with
fingerprint readers, so only authorised users are authenticated to use the robot.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Intrusion Detection Systems are ef-
fective counter-measures for detecting attacks or improper use of systems by
detecting any anomalies or inappropriate use of the host machines or networks.
The concept of IDSs was first introduced by Anderson in 1980 [3]. There are
three main intrusion detection approaches: signature-based, anomaly-based, and
specification-based [34,50,37].
Signature-based systems recognise basic pre-packaged patterns of misbeha-
viour. For example, three consecutive failed attempts to log into a cobot man-
agement system might be regarded as a ‘signature’ of a potential attack. Another
example includes the use of specific payloads in service requests recognised by
the presence of specific bit strings in code. The bit string would form a signature
of malfeasance.
An anomaly-based approach typically seeks to profile ‘normal behaviour in
some way and measure how closely current behaviour is to that previously ascer-
tained profile. Often, the underlying measure is a statistical one, and an anomaly
is raised when current behaviour veers outside the historically established pro-
file of normal behaviour. Some attributes lend themselves to monitoring in this
way, for example many events incurred, such as the number of page faults or
cache-misses. Often an anomaly-based system is required to classify current be-
haviour as ‘normal’ or ‘anomalous’. Thus, it is no surprise that a wide variety of
pattern classification approaches can, and have, been brought to bear on intru-
sion detection problems. A major claim for anomaly-based approaches is that
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they have good potential for detecting previously unseen attacks. The degree to
which this is true is controversial; strictly speaking, they will flag as anomalous
monitored behaviours that are not reasonably close to historic trends. However,
some malicious attacks may have behaviours that are plausibly consistent with
normal behaviours. If the symptoms of an attack are similar to the symptoms of
another anomalous attack then the new attack will also be flagged as anomalous.
Furthermore, most behaviours are unique if you look into the detail. Thus, such
approaches require that, at some level of detail, attacks look different to ‘normal’
behaviour. This may or may not be true.
Specification-based intrusion detection [50], being a niche application, as-
sumes that the behaviour follows a specified protocol. An intrusion is any devi-
ation from this protocol. A variety of attacks on communication or application
protocols can be detected this way. For example, a malicious application running
on a cobot may attempt to make use of currently unused fields in a communi-
cation protocol to leak information. Such leaking will be detectable.
An example of the application of intrusion detection techniques to a robotic
system is given in [26], where the authors implement an IDS using deep learning
models. There are two components in the system proposed: one signature-based
and one anomaly-based. The signature-based component is intended to detect
misuse by identifying known malicious activity signatures, whilst the anomaly-
based component detects behavioural anomalies by analysing deviations from
the expected behaviour. The approach has two significant challenges: processing
time and detection accuracy. In short, the IDS must be very fast with a low false
positive rate. This is acceptable when using the signature-based model, but the
anomaly detection component requires more time and is more prone to falsely
indicating an attack.
In another instance, Fagiolini, Dini and Bicchi [12] propose an intrusion de-
tection system that detects misbehaviour in systems where robots interact on
the premise of event-based rules. They refer to misbehaving robots as intruders
that may exhibit uncooperative behaviour due to spontaneous failure or ma-
licious reprogramming. The proposed IDS is applied in an industrial scenario
where a number of automated forklifts move within an environment that can be
represented as a matrix of cells and macro-cells.
3.3 Application to Cobots
To the best of our knowledge, there would appear to be no published research
specifically targeting security for cobots. However, the authors are currently
undertaking work into the application of security concepts described above. In
the next section we identify some of these and explain why the application to
cobotic security may require some sophistication.
Security Policy. Since the rise of cobots is quite recent we should not be sur-
prised to find no security policy work specifically targeting cobots. This area,
however, is an intriguing and subtle one. A security policy will generally have
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to maintain some notion of privacy, as personal data may be stored in the sys-
tem (e.g. a staff capabilities database). But the area is much more subtle than
is usual for security policy. Issues of who should get access to what and under
what circumstances, may have significant effect on co-workers. What is a rea-
sonable policy on access when there is contention between co-workers? What is
suitable ’etiquette’ in such cases? Some data will be less privacy-sensitive and
safety-relevant and the motivations for security policy elements will be different.
A security policy and its implementation may be able to enforce elements of
safety practice. For example, overly long shifts that break working time direc-
tives can be readily policed via security policy. Requirements for suitable skills
or training can be enforced too. Ultimately, a great deal of reasonable co-working
constraints boil down to access control of one form or another and such control
can be specified via policy.
Authentication. Our current work is carried out in collaboration with indus-
trial users of cobots. Workers generally operate a single robot cell and work
on a continual basis, punctuated by scheduled breaks. It seems highly unlikely
that the robots in these cells can be faked or replaced in some way without
notice (though we accept that software could be maliciously updated). Conse-
quently, it is only one-way user-to-robot authentication that needs to be consid-
ered. However, this authentication needs to be persistent, to account for changes
in staffing. Some notion of initial authentication by traditional means, for exam-
ple a standard password or token based approach, can be supplemented by an
appropriate continuous authentication method. We are currently investigating
the use of physical interaction properties (i.e. forces applied to the robot by the
co-worker) and other biometrics (accelerometry applied to co-worker hands, eye
movements and ECG monitoring) for user authentication.
The resources and capabilities made available by a cobot may vary across
co-workers. Part of the appeal of cobots is, however, that they can be readily
reprogrammed to do a variety of tasks. As co-workers may vary in their skills,
experience and qualifications, we might quite legitimately allow certain tasks to
be done only by co-workers with specific skills and training. A suitably configured
system with access to the capabilities of specific users can easily enforce such
policies. Thus, issues of cobot policy compliance can readily be handled via
suitable access control, provided there is credible user authentication.
3.4 Challenges for Cobot Security
Many aspects of cybersecurity analysis and system development remain unal-
tered. But our work so far reveals that cobots also present either specific chal-
lenges in their own right, or else require considerable subtlety of thought to
engage with cobot-specifics. Below we highlight areas we believe are in need of
security focus:
Developing security policies and related elements that fully take into account
the human, including both single co-worker cases and multi-co-worker cases.
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Policies must be sympathetic of user needs, well-being, and diversity issues.
Crafting a policy for a mobile cobot working in different company domains is as
much an exercise in occupational psychology as it is an issue in cyber-security.
Particularly, in an industrial work setting, the co-working modus operandi and
co-worker well-being must be considered. There are significant possibilities of
couching a variety of working practice constraints in terms of security policy.
Development of practical templates for authentication requirements. Authen-
tication needs will vary a great deal between deployment domains. Thus, a single
worker collaborating with an industrial robot on a welding task might lend itself
to initial password logon followed by continuous authentication by a variety of
means (e.g. biometrics or token). Manufacturing with several on-site suppliers
and changing external staffing is markedly different, perhaps requiring on-going
speech recognition for continuous authentication. Guidance will need to be de-
veloped about the pros and cons of authentication approaches in specific cobot
environments. These will include guidance regarding specific approaches in harsh
electromagnetic environments. As an example of the latter, one of our industrial
collaborators uses cobots to perform elements of arc-welding; the arc-ing could
affect any authentication scheme based around wireless communications (includ-
ing, e.g. distance bounding protocols).
Development of a plausible strategy for cobot forensics, which as far as we
are aware, has received no attention in the literature. Digital forensics is largely
concerned with the generation of credible evidence as to who did what, where and
when (and also why). This is important not just for cyber-security reasons, for
example to investigate security breaches, but also for health and safety reasons,
where reconstructing an accident from event logs may be required.
Developing a credible IDS for use in cobotic environments. Again, we know
of no work in this area. It is clear that domain specifics will need to be handled.
Mobile cobots will present challenges over and above those for fixed cobots.
4 Cobot Co-Assurance
In previous sections, we have discussed how to reduce safety and security risks
in cobots, and the challenges that arise. However, reducing risk within the in-
dividual domains alone is insufficient to claim the acceptability of overall risk.
There are multiple factors that can affect co-assurance and the confidence in the
reduction of overall risk. These factors can be divided into two categories:
Socio-technical Factors – these are concerned with the processes, technol-
ogy, structure and people required for co-engineering and the co-assurance
process. Such factors play an important role, e.g. in complex information sys-
tems engineering [5], and so co-assuring socio-technical factors encompasses
a large scope that includes organisational, regulatory, and ethical structures,
management practices, competence, information management tools, etc.
Technical Factors – these are primarily concerned with the causal relation-
ships between risk conditions and artefacts of the engineered system, e.g.
accidents, hazards, attacks, threats, safety and security requirements.
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Below, we consider these factors for cobots, and discuss the challenges that
arise with respect to the interactions between safety and security risks.
4.1 Socio-technical Challenges
The many socio-technical challenges include:
Ethics. Interaction with co-workers is at the core of cobot use and ethics
issues will inevitably arise. For example, ethical issues related to operator moni-
toring within the cobot will have to be resolved, for example by getting informed
consent from co-workers.
Risk prioritisation. The principled handling of trade-offs across competing
risks in cobots (safety, security, economic etc.) requires care in both ‘normal’ and
exceptional circumstances. For example, when a security problem has been pub-
lished with potential safety implications but a vendor patch is not yet available
(possibly a common occurrence given the heavy use of commercially available
components in cobots), what should be done immediately? Different actions may
have different economic consequences and organisations are rarely equipped to
judge such situations rapidly.
Risk representation and communication. To facilitate better decision making,
the profile of various risks in particular circumstances needs to be made appar-
ent, e.g. using structured risk analysis (Section 1.1). This may encompass risk
attributes outside the usual safety and security (or further dependability).
Coordinating and integrating risk analyses. The system design may be mod-
ified, as the design and analyses progress, to incorporate necessary security and
safety mechanisms. Since neither security nor safety are preserved under refine-
ment (i.e. moving to a more concrete representation) the specific way a safety
or security measure is implemented matters and so safety and security synchro-
nisation will be required at what are believed to be at feasibly stable points in
the development. Table 1 on page 4 summarises several candidate approaches to
be adopted to prioritise, align, or integrate safety/security analyses.
Ensuring quality and availability of third party evidence. Cobots will usually
integrate components from several vendors. Those components may draw on
further vendors’ products. Ensuring the quality or availability of relevant docu-
mentation throughout the supply chain to support safety and security assurance
arguments, both individually and together, due to interdependencies, will of-
ten prove challenging. A vendor patch to a vulnerability may, for example, be
available only as an executable.
Handling dynamic threat and impact landscapes. A cobot’s threat landscape
may vary greatly over time, e.g. when new vulnerabilities in critical components
emerge, and this will likely affect safety. Rapidly assessing the safety impact of
security flaws (and vice versa) is not a mainstream activity for manufacturing
organisations and the skills required may well be lacking.
Resourcing safety and security interactions. There are many interactions be-
tween safety and security in cobots. Resourcing the investigation of such aspects
will present significant challenges in the workplace.
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Increasing automation of assurance. Cobot assurance is complex and dy-
namic, requiring repeated analyses and risk judgements to be frequently revis-
ited. Increasing automation of assurance will be essential to ensure feasibility of
any sound process. Table 1 (rightmost column) on page 4 lists approaches that,
used individually or in combination, can be a basis for continuous alignment of
safety and security assurance of cobots in manufacturing.
4.2 Technical Challenges
Some technical challenges in cobot co-assurance are given below:
Deadly conflicts. Cobots may be used in dangerous environments with hu-
man presence. Protecting against dangerous, and possibly deadly, conflicts is a
challenge. For example, ensuring access control policy does not cause problems,
i.e. by prohibiting essential data access for maintaining safety.
Consolidated audit policy. Logging events are an important, if somewhat pro-
saic, component of cobots. Many events could be logged but the potential volume
is huge. We need to determine for what purposes we would want logged infor-
mation and seek to craft a fitting policy. For security purposes, we might wish
to access logs for determining situational awareness, for identifying specific be-
haviours, or for contributing towards evidence in a criminal court case. For safety
purposes, we might wish to reconstruct an accident and its causes. We must be
aware of the possibility of logging causing problems (e.g. affecting real-time per-
formance of critical services or, even worse, causing deadlocks). Of course, the
logs themselves must be protected from attack, as a successful security attack
might destroy forensic log evidence. The topic of attribution is difficult in almost
any system, however the complexity of cobots and their wider connectedness will
make this aspect even hard for cobots.
Unifying anomaly detection. There are challenges regarding the efficient use
of data to inform anomaly detection for safety and security as the data that
can inform safety and security decisions may overlap. For example, the pres-
ence of sophisticated malware might reveal itself in degradation trends of opera-
tional performance. Thus, traditional health monitoring for safety and predictive
maintenance reasons might highlight the presence of malware (one of Stuxnet’s
remarkable attack goals was to cause centrifuges to wear out more quickly [13]).
Reacting to compromise. What should be done when some elements of a cobot
are perceived to be compromised in some way (e.g. via physical component failure
or the presence of malware)? Having detected something is potentially ‘wrong’,
management may wish to take appropriate action. This requires significant sit-
uational awareness (which may be difficult in cobots) and we need to be very
careful to ensure the cure (response) is not worse than the problem, i.e. does
not itself cause unpalatable security or safety issues. Some degree of degradation
may be inevitable.
Ensuring resilience to direct access. Cobots will come into close proximity
with humans providing an opportunity for interference or damage, both physical
and digital. We must find useful and preferably common mechanisms to either
resist attack or else make it apparent when it has occurred.
Safety-Security Co-Assurance for Collaborative Industrial Robots 19
Coping under failure. The failure modes of a cobot and their consequences
must be thoroughly understood. A degraded system may be compromisable in
ways a fully operational system is not. Co-assurance approaches from process au-
tomation such as, e.g. FACT [47], could cross-fertilise cobot-specific co-assurance
procedures.
Adversarial attacks. Systems whose activities are underpinned by machine
learning or other AI8 may be susceptible to adversarial attack. This is where
the robot is fooled into malfunctioning in some way because it is presented with
specially crafted input. This is a common worry from both a security and safety
perspective.
Testing of cobots. Current robot testing approaches will need to be adapted
to the new requirements of cobot settings. Moreover, the development of more
rigorous testing approaches for cobots is essential.
Software and system update. Cobot and wider system update is a common
concern and we need to ensure updates are made with appropriate authority,
integrity, and that the updates do not cause unpalatable harm. From a security
perspective, patches are a commonplace, however the safety implications of such
changes are rarely considered. Other domains understand the importance of
maintaining integrity of updates (e.g. updating of remote satellites or automotive
software in the field). In some cases updates may need to be ‘hot’, i.e. at run-
time. Again, a compromised update process will play havoc with safety and
security. Furthermore, the effects of a host of run-time attacks are likely to have
safety implications (e.g. attacks on a database via SQL injection, or similar).
4.3 Conclusion
With this chapter, we summarise general approaches to safety and security as-
surance for cobots. Further detail is provided in the form of risk-based assurance
approaches for both safety and security of cobots (Section 1.1), illustrated by
an example (Sections 2.3 and 3.3). Finally, we describe the challenges that arise
when attempting to assure and align the two quality attributes for a cobot. These
challenges are not limited to technical factors about how and when to relate risk
conditions between safety and security, but include significant socio-technical
factors that influence the co-assurance process itself. These challenges form the
crux of the contribution of this work. Although no claims are made with regards
to completeness, we believe that the challenges identified in Section 4 form the
basis of a preliminary research roadmap, and that addressing them is essential
for the safe and secure deployment of cobots in an industrial setting.
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8 Cobots, as with other manufacturing technologies, will include increasingly complex
artificial intelligence software.
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